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If I were Mark Tushnet and felt the urge that sometimes overcomes
him, I I could do quite a job on the new federal courts casebook of which
he is co-author. 2 I could say that the book suffered from too much slop-
piness; that its organization was at times unhelpful and unclear; that its
extensive notes occasionally were turgid and opaque; that the quality of
its discussion problems was uneven; and that the authors did not always
rise above tendentiousness. For each of these criticisms, there would be
good foundation.
Yet to say all that, however accurate, without saying more would do
a grave injustice to a commendable book. Federal Jurisdiction: Policy
and Practice, by Professors Howard Fink and Mark Tushnet, is an up-to-
date, comprehensive set of materials especially well geared for the class-
room. The book is provocative and insightful, with thorough principal
case coverage, valuable background explanations, and detailed notes, in a
compact 880 pages of text. With rare exceptions, it is inclusive enough to
permit some selectivity without making it necessary to forage through
reams to pluck out pages worth having students read. Whatever
problems exist with it now, 3 it already belongs in the first rank of federal
* Joseph S. Platt-Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur Professor of Law, The Ohio State
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1. See, e.g., Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, 78 MICH. L. REv. 694 (1980).
2. H. FINK & M. TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: POLICY AND PRACTICE (1984) [herein-
after cited by page reference alone].
3. I understand that the publisher plans a second printing of the present edition, which could
eliminate many of the minor errors that mar the first printing. The authors decided, helpfully for
those using the book the first semester it was in print, to adopt a late cutoff date of April 20, 1984
(see p. viii), yet they made their hardbound volume available in time for classes beginning in late
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courts casebooks.
I taught using the Fink and Tushnet volume during the fall semester
of 1984, and one aim of this review is to reflect that classroom experience
for the benefit of those who might consider adopting the book.4 To give a
sense of how the book is put together and what makes it distinctive, the
review discusses its coverage, unique introductory chapters, and overall
organization; considers some problems the book presents to teachers and
students; and deals with the question whether the involvement of Mark
Tushnet, prominent as a controversialist on the left of legal academe, has
made for a tendentious set of teaching materials.
To begin with, the jurisdictional emphasis in the book's title could
mislead. The authors do include all the major areas of federal court ju-
risdiction: congressional authority to regulate and restrict, justiciability,
federal question and diversity jurisdiction, ancillary and pendent jurisdic-
tional issues, and appellate jurisdiction. Those sections account, how-
ever, for roughly half the volume. The remainder covers other significant
federalism problems treated in most federal courts books, such as implied
rights of action, the eleventh amendment, Erie, civil rights enforcement,
"Our Federalism," and habeas corpus. In every major area I wanted to
teach, the book had ample material.
It begins with four chapters that both cover important specific topics
and introduce broad recurring themes. The short first chapter outlines
the history and present structure of the federal court system and raises
themes of "localism" versus "centralism" and the issue of "parity" be-
tween state and federal courts. It presents no cases in detail, relying on
text and extracts from commentary. The second chapter takes up the
constitutional limits on federal judicial authority, primarily illustrated by
August, with coverage extending through most of the Supreme Court's 1983-84 Term. The speed
did exact its price in a moderately high number of small typographical and editing errors, many of
which should not survive a new printing.
Some sloppinesses of a slightly larger nature and seemingly not attributable to last-minute
proofreading difficulties, however, crept in as well. Several times the first full mention of a case or
other authority has been edited out of an opinion, but a later shorthand reference, now cryptic and
confusing, remains. One note (p. 522 n.4) refers to a possible compulsory counterclaim on the part
of a defendant with no independent claim against anyone. A later note (p. 576 n.l) referring to the
same case speaks of the still-living first wife of a decedent as the second wife's sister; even in the
unlikely event that this were so, it is confusingly beside the point that the note makes about a proce-
dural issue in the case. (With admirable impartiality, the authors mis-cite one of Professor Fink's
own articles-Fink, Indispensable Parties and the Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule 19, 74 YALE
L.J. 403 (1965), cited at p. 586 to volume 79.) Fortunately, such errors are not common, but those
mentioned are not the only ones and unnecessarily mar a generally well-edited book.
4. Because I have only looked through rather than taught from other federal courts casebooks,
the emphasis in this review will be on the Fink and Tushnet book itself without attempts at specific
comparisons.
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Osborn v. Bank of the United States5 (p. 23) and Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee 6 (p. 40). The third chapter introduces the theme of the relation-
ship between Court and Congress, exemplified by implied constitutional
and statutory rights of action in such cases as Bivens7 (p. 57) and Cort v.
Ash8 (note at p. 76). The fourth chapter closes a circle by returning to
concerns raised at the beginning, treating the tension between federal and
state court authority in enforcing federal rights, primarily in cases under
section 1983. 9
These introductory chapters, which account for about an eighth of
the book, proceed on two main levels and require some professorial ex-
plicitness to keep students from missing the forest for the trees. Thrown
into rather complex problems on a first level-the differences between
congressional authority over constitutional and statutory rights of action,
for instance-students can readily overlook the broader theme of Court-
Congress tensions which Fink and Tushnet are introducing at the same
time on a second level and for which the implied rights problem serves as
an example. The complexity of the authors' presentation in these early
chapters illustrates a point that holds for the work as a whole: this is not
a book for teachers who want only the cases, without distraction from
theoretical concerns at or near the surface in their materials. But I like
what the authors do in their introductory section, and several times later
in the course students spontaneously invoked the general themes from
the early chapters in connection with issues that arose as we proceeded.
Fink and Tushnet provide the basis for considerable richness in the study
and presentation of the material, although in ways that demand the at-
tention and imagination of students and professors alike.
Following the introductory section, the next two chapters pursue
further the theme of federal-state tensions in two quite distinct areas-
the eleventh amendment and the Erie doctrine. The logic of the authors'
organization here seems to be on their higher, thematic level, rather than
in terms of any apparent relationship of the specific subject matter. Their
themes are evident enough from the previous chapters, though, and some
5. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (defining article III judicial power broadly to include any
case in which federal question "forms an ingredient of the original cause").
6. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816) (United States Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in-
cludes power over cases from state courts).
7. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971) (violation of fourth amendment ban on unreasonable searches and seizures by federal agent
gives rise to cause of action for damages despite lack of specific federal statute addressing issue).
8. 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (enunciating criteria for judicial implication of right of action based on
federal statute not specifically creating private cause of action).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (authorizing federal cause of action for deprivation of federal rights
under color of state law).
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professors might want to teach these next two in different sequence-the
eleventh amendment with other immunities, and Erie with diversity ju-
risdiction or with other aspects of the law applicable once federal juris-
diction has been properly invoked. The subtlety of the authors'
underlying ideas at points such as this suggests a need for a teachers'
manual; although I thought a good deal about their themes and intercon-
nections and tried to bring these out in class, at times the authors' logic
escaped me. In the book itself these larger connections are, perhaps ap-
propriately, only sporadically drawn in such explicit fashion. Their com-
plexity, however, underscores the need for a manual to disclose the
hidden ball.
After the first six chapters, about a fourth of the volume, the overall
organization becomes more conventional. The book proceeds through
Court-Congress issues (political questions, congressional delegation of
article III matters to non-article III federal tribunals, and congressional
power over jurisdiction); justiciability; diversity and federal question ju-
risdiction, including removal, multiparty joinder and ancillary jurisdic-
tion, and federal-state res judicata; federal-state court interface ("Our
Federalism," structural injunctions, abstention, civil rights damages, and
habeas corpus); and appellate jurisdiction of both the Supreme Court and
the federal courts of appeals. The authors generally maintain a high
standard of intelligent case selection, with a particularly good mix of old
classics and modem leading cases; inclusiveness without excessive detail;
and extensive, thoughtful notes that usually are not overwhelming. A
few types of problems do recur often enough to warrant discussion here.
To make the teaching go smoothly, however, the book requires at most
some modest reorganization and trimming for class study, supplementa-
tion with one or two key omitted cases, and explicit mention to the class
of occasional problems with the text.
Because the authors' organization sometimes is questionable, some-
one teaching from this book for the first time would do well to stay a few
jumps ahead of the class and think about the exact order in which to
assign materials within chapters. The political question doctrine, for ex-
ample, has a good deal in common with, and is often treated alongside,
the other justiciability doctrines of standing, ripeness, and mootness. It
thus seems unhelpful for it to come at the beginning of Chapter 7, sepa-
rated from the remainder of the justiciability material (in Chapter 8) by
the Northern Pipelinet0 (p. 229) and Tidewater" (note at p. 256)
10. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (partially
invalidating Congressional assignment of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction to non-article III bank-
ruptcy judges).
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problems and a section on congressional control over federal court
jurisdiction.
Similarly, in theirjus tertii section the authors begin with a leading
case (Broadrick, 1 2 at p. 335) on overbreadth, shift to notes and a case on
generaljus tertii doctrine (which might better have come first), and then
conclude with notes on overbreadth. This is tough enough stuff for most
students without the added burden of going from pillar to post and back
again to bring related material together. Here, as elsewhere, it could be
that I am missing some insight that explains the authors' decision to ar-
range the materials as they did. I don't think my perspectives are so
idiosyncratic, though, that all other teachers would escape the same
problem. Again, if the authors have something subtle in mind, it would
help if they put their thoughts into a manual.
One other illustration of internal organization problems should suf-
fice. The second principal case, and the first really major one, in the
multiple-claims-and-parties section is Field v. Volkswagenwerk, AG 13 (p.
514), a complex party joinder/ancillary jurisdiction case that divided a
panel of the Third Circuit. Field is a splendid case-and, in my judg-
ment, a perfectly dreadful one to lead with. It may be only a matter of
style, but to me it seems far preferable to bring students along through
easier basics of joinder and pendent and ancillary jurisdiction (claim join-
der, Gibbs,1 4 permissive party joinder, Aldinger, 15 impleader, and Owen
Equipment1 6) before giving them anything as complex as Field. Students
definitely should study the case or something like it, but the authors'
organization unnecessarily risks having many students drown early in
deep water for want of reviewing (or learning) some basic strokes first. 17
These problems with internal organization are not the only reason
why teachers using this book might find it more important than usual to
11. National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949) (upholding, with-
out majority opinion, inclusion of District of Columbia citizens within definition of "state" citizens
for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, despite argument that article III judicial power was thereby
exceeded).
12. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (upholding the facial constitutionality of
Oklahoma statute regulating political activities of state workers where statute was not substantially
overbroad and appellant's activity fell within areas which the state had power to regulate).
13. 626 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1980).
14. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (pendent jurisdiction over related state
law claim in federal question case).
15. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976) (no "pendent party" jurisdiction over related state
law claim against county in suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) against county official).
16. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1977) (no ancillary jurisdiction in
diversity case over plaintiff's claim against nondiverse third-party defendant).
17. Moreover, though Field turns crucially on the distinction between Federal Rules 19 and 20,
the authors unhelpfully quote only Rule 19 with the case (p. 514), saving the text of Rule 20 for
several pages later (p. 528) without any cross-reference in connection with Field.
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stay more than one class ahead of the students and think about exactly
what to assign. Although generally I was pleased with case selection and
textual notes, at times case choice is puzzling, and occasionally the notes'
sheer length obscures their main points and poses the risk of student
tuneout if they are assigned in full. Moreover, the problems included for
discussion are irregular in quality and usefulness.
The class actions portion of the book's multiparty section illustrates
two types of problems that sometimes crop up with case selection: sim-
ple slighting of important cases, and slipping from a focus on federalism
problems to one on straight procedure. The subsection starts with the
Supreme Court's 1921 Ben-Hur decision (p. 549),18 which has continu-
ing, if limited, significance for federal court jurisdiction over diversity
class actions. Fine. But the book has next to nothing on the crucial
modem jurisdictional decisions of Snyder v. Harris'9 (note at p. 570) and
Zahn v. International Paper Co. 20 (note at p. 570). Moreover, after Ben-
Hur it wanders off with two longish and not particularly significant fed-
eral district court cases that seem to do little but illustrate the application
of the criteria of Federal Rule 23 (pp. 555, 561). Since state court sys-
tems widely follow the federal civil rules, such problems of application
have little special relevance for a federal courts course, unlike the almost
uniquely federal issues in Snyder and Zahn. Short discussion of rule ap-
plication problems in a note could be useful as background and refresher,
but they hardly seem worth four-fifths of the pages devoted to class ac-
tions in a book on federal jurisdiction and should be left primarily to
basic or intermediate procedure courses. 21 I skipped the book's entire
class actions subsection, distributed extracts from Zahn with some detail
18. Supreme Tribe ofBen-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921) (to determine whether complete
diversity is present, citizenship of named class representatives only and not that of unnamed class
members is to be taken into account).
19. 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (class members' claims normally may not be aggregated to meet appli-
cable jurisdictional amount requirement).
20. 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (even when some class members' claims satisfy jurisdictional amount
requirement, there is no ancillary jurisdiction over related below-limit claims of other class
members).
21. If the authors had sought to write a book on federal jurisdiction and procedure in general,
the criticism offered here would be beside the point, or at least would have to be made on a different
level. The book's focus, however, seems very much on what has come to be widely regarded as the
stuff of a "federal courts" course, excluding, for instance, virtually all mention of pleading and dis-
covery. Departures from the emphasis on specifically federal issues thus seem to require a justifica-
tion that is not apparent in this instance.
Another, and lesser, illustration of wandering from a focus on specifically federal matters is the
inclusion of Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), as a principal case (p. 598) even
though its main effect is simply to adopt for the federal courts the general modem rule on offensive
collateral estoppel. One trouble with such lengthy treatment of peripheral matters is that it makes it
difficult to give the class necessary background for the later, specifically federalist problems without
spending too much time on topics that are more germane to other courses.
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on Ben-Hur and Snyder, and based class discussion on those cases
instead.
A professor who followed the time-honored method of assigning the
next twenty or so pages for every class, whatever they contained, would
likely face mutiny from the students when they came to some of the notes
in this book. For the most part the notes are excellent and to the point;
but several times the authors get carried away, going on and on in seem-
ingly endless pages of fine print. In these stretches I was selective in
making assignments and found much that was valuable, but the notes
could be so overwhelming at these few places that more selectivity by the
authors-or, again, a teachers' manual emphasizing their main points-
would have been welcome. Seven pages (pp. 391-97) of notes after Ly-
ons 22 (p. 377), seven (pp. 470-76) on the fine points of federal question
jurisdiction right after the essential but fiendishly difficult Franchise Tax
Board23 opinion (p. 459), nine (pp. 630-38) with sixteen numbered notes
after Steffel v. Thompson24 (p. 627), and four (pp. 783-86) of long lower
court extracts on one issue arising out of Stone v. Powel125 (p.763)-these
make pretty indigestible lumps.
Selectivity seems in order as well in assigning the problems the au-
thors have included. Such problems can often be valuable foci for class
discussion, but their quality in this book is uneven. Some, like the one in
the habeas corpus section (p. 716), are accessible yet rigorous and valua-
ble. Others, such as that in the Erie chapter asking the student to act as a
State Department legal adviser working on a fundamental law for an Is-
raeli-Jordanian-Palestinian federation (p. 163), seem strained and puz-
zling. Again, a teachers' manual sharing the authors' vision might help.
I have saved for last a question that some will have wondered about
from the appearance of Mark Tushnet's name on a federal courts
casebook: whether the work is infected with tendentiousness. 26 The
22. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (victim of police "choke hold" practice
who has standing to sue for damages has no standing to seek injunction against practice).
23. Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983) (reaffirm-
ing "well-pleaded complaint" rule for federal question jurisdiction in case involving attempted re-
moval to federal court of state declaratory judgment action in which complaint mentioned federal
issue).
24. 415 U.S. 452 (1974) (when no state proceeding is pending, ordinary prerequisites for declar-
atory relief apply in federal action for declaration of unconstitutionality of state criminal law).
25. 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (fourth amendment exclusionary rule claim not cognizable in federal
habeas corpus proceeding by state prisoner who had opportunity for full and fair litigation of claim
in state courts).
26. Because intellectual honesty is monopolized by no part of the political spectrum, Professor
Tushnet's Marxism and prominent identification with the Critical Legal Studies movement ideally
should cause no more automatic concern about tendentiousness in a casebook bearing his name than,
say, Paul Bator's judicial conservatism. The discussion in the text is prompted by a hunch that
many in the legal teaching profession will approach a casebook co-authored by Tushnet with more
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large majority of the book, I think, is not; to the contrary, for the most
part the authors have been admirably fair-minded. 27 The book does con-
tain some frank criticism of "conservative" Supreme Court opinions and
occasionally suggests alternative approaches. Yet it presents the views of
judicial conservatives extensively in their own words and sometimes of-
fers possible rationales for "conservative" trends not developed by the
Justices themselves. It suggests, for example (pp. 744, 810), that the
habeas corpus statute is so general that it might properly be viewed as a
"delegation" to the Supreme Court of authority to define (and, presuma-
bly, narrow) the scope of the writ. And at one point it refers to a dissent
by Justice Rehnquist as "powerful" and "sensibl[e]" (p. 268).
The book handles controversial areas, in other words, with much
balance. I do not mind when the authors express a well-argued view of
their own and include enough for students to grasp the choices being
presented. At its worst, this is usually a very good book to teach
against-in the highly complimentary sense that its controvertible view-
points are not simply knee-jerk assertions but thoughtful arguments that
can provoke further insight and provide a basis for fruitful class
discussion.
I do mind, however, an occasional tendentiousness of characteriza-
tion that can obstruct accurate understanding of cases. It needlessly con-
fuses students as to what the Supreme Court actually held in Bell v.
Hood28 (p. 53) (precious little) to identify as its "principle" that "general
grants of jurisdiction should be construed to authorize effective remedies
for the invasion of legal rights" (p. 55). Apart from some dictum of un-
certain sweep Bell was quite agnostic on that issue, and the later Bivens
decision 29 lends itself far better to the interpretation the authors suggest.
Similarly, when the book refers unqualifiedly and in bold type to the "de-
mise" (p. 304) of Flast v. Cohen30 (p. 276), it is predictable that many
students will get the impression that the case has actually been overruled.
suspicion than works by other academics, especially since they are likely to feel, from the tone of
some of his earlier writings, see, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 1, that he has asked for it.
As for Tushnet's co-author Howard Fink, from the portions of the book for which he was
responsible (primarily Erie, the federal courts' statutory jurisdiction, and the material on multiple
claims and parties), I feel unable to hazard any guess as to his politics.
27. A few students did think they detected some signs of bias, and I once noticed the volume
referred to as "Tushnet's Little Red Book."
28. 327 U.S. 678 (1946) (nonfrivolous legal claim of deprivation of federal right should be dis-
missed, if at all, only for failure to state claim upon which relief can be granted and not for want of
federal jurisdiction).
29. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971) (see supra note 7).
30. 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (taxpayer had standing to challenge federal expenditures as violating
establishment clause).
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Thus far, however, it has suffered no worse fate than being sharply (and
quite arbitrarily) limited to its facts.31 This sort of twist, though, is mi-
nor and infrequent enough that it would be hard to see anything but a
reverse tendentiousness in an effort to make a great deal of it.
Some might, finally, take exception to an explicit view that underlies
much of the authors' presentation. As they make plain in their preface
(p. vii), for Fink and Tushnet the study of federal jurisdiction does not
properly involve the search for some historical "true meaning" of the
words of article III and the basic jurisdictional statutes. They see instead
a series of compromises between conflicting ideas and interests, especially
between "centralism" and "localism" and over the separation of powers,
that continue both to influence and to afford a range of choice for legisla-
tion and judicial decisionmaking today. This perspective shares some el-
ements with Tushnet's efforts elsewhere to demonstrate the
indeterminacy of much legal reasoning, which he uses as a point of de-
parture for attacking liberal theory as lacking in coherence. 32 One
might, therefore, wonder if Tushnet is trying to slip a larger hidden
agenda into the minds of his unsuspecting readers.
Analyzing Tushnet's motives in this connection, or resolving the
substantive issues raised by the authors' perspective, is beyond the scope
of this review. In any event, a good deal of the agenda is not at all hid-
den but stated openly. In many of its applications, moreover, the idea of
no historical "true meaning" should be quite noncontroversial. 33
Though the federal courts have constructed a working if sometimes
creaky system on the basis of the well-settled complete diversity require-
ment,34 for example, it is not at all hard to conceive of Strawbridge v.
Curtiss coming out either way and a coherent scheme being built upon a
minimal diversity rule.
Fink and Tushnet may leave themselves open here to being read as
saying more than they intend. Presumably, they do not mean to imply
that when the struggle of conflicting strains results in a victory or com-
promise written into positive law, it settles nothing and judges have the
31. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (distinguishing but not overruling Flast in denying standing to taxpayers
seeking to challenge below-market transfer of federal property to church group as establishment
clause violation).
32. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 1; Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983) (arguing that interpretivism and
neutral principles were produced by liberal theory to constrain the judiciary, but rest on premises
inconsistent with liberalism).
33. Cf., eg., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 93 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (in case about
standards for punitive damage awards in civil rights actions, "[t]he battle of the string citations [to
Reconstruction legislative history] can have no winner").
34. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1803).
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same range of choices as before. If it is fair to add this qualification to
their view, then within their overall perspective some matters will be de-
terminate at least in the sense that one or more conceivable positions will
have been excluded from the range of possible judicial-or, in the case of
constitutional provisions, legislative-choice. Similarly, I do not take
them to be implying that we can never discern the purposes of the victors
in legislative battle well enough to find persuasive support for one among
contending interpretations. 35 With these qualifications their "no true
meaning" perspective seems fairly unexceptionable, and their emphasis
on themes influencing legislative and judicial lawmaking adds helpful
elucidation.
As the foregoing pages suggest, this admirable book may not be for
everyone. If your preference is to have just the cases, thank you, this is
not your book. If you are sensitive to a more than minimal, though not
serious, level of editing errors, you will find cause for complaint. If you
are unlikely to be able to stay a few classes ahead of your students the
first time through in order to think about occasional cutting, supplement-
ing, and rearranging, you could find it troublesome. And I am not sure I
would recommend it for very new teachers, who might lack the depth of
background needed to conceive of some useful adjustments. But if you
want a rich and demanding book from which you can learn a great deal
as you teach, and if you can afford some time and patience when you first
use it, I commend it highly. I had to work hard teaching from this book,
sometimes rather harder than should have been necessary; but thanks to
all that Professors Fink and Tushnet put into it, I felt my efforts were
well rewarded. I will use the book again with enthusiasm and without
hesitation.
35. The authors themselves sometimes seem to take quite seriously constitutional history and
its implications for present interpretations. They refer (p. 108), for example, to Reconstruction as
effecting a "substantial reworking of traditional assumptions about the relations among individuals,
state governments, and the national government" and (id.) to recent scholarship as indicating that
"Justice Frankfurter was wrong" in a key premise of his dissent on the interpretation of section 1983
in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 202 (1961).
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